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1. Introduction: An Episode in the History of Science
As soon as Maxwell published his first paper on the kinetic theory of gases in 1860, he
noted that a major consequence of its principles, namely the equipartition theorem, conflicted
with known empirical data about the specific heats of poly-atomic gases. According to the
equipartition theorem, the total kinetic energy of an isolated system of particles at equilibrium
is equally distributed among the particles’ degrees of freedom. The equipartition theorem
implies that the calculated values of γ, the ratio between the specific heat of a substance at
constant pressure and its specific heat at constant volume, disagree with the measured ones,
except for monoatomic gases. The calculated values of γ are too small compared to the
measured ones (see table 1). This is called the “specific heats problem”. It originates in the
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difficulty to guess, at the end of 19th century, how many degrees of freedom a polyatomic
molecule possesses, and has only been solved with quantum mechanics. We now have a very
different conception of molecules – a quantum conception, providing us with an explanation
of the failure of classical statistical mechanics  – but at the time, the structure of molecules
was completely opaque.
 In spite of the theory being empirically refuted, Maxwell and Boltzmann went one
developing it. True, Maxwell has pessimistic sentences at the end of his 1860 paper:
“This result [the equipartition theorem for a system of polyatomic molecules] […]
seems decisive against the unqualified acceptation of the hypothesis that gases are
such systems of elastic bodies.”
And here is the last sentence of the final summary concluding the paper:
“Finally, by establishing a necessary relation between the motions of translation and
rotation of all particles not spherical, we proved that a system of such particles could
not possibly satisfy the known relation between the two specific heats of all gases.”
Maxwell nevertheless:
- published his results,
- and went further in the exploration of his theory.
Moreover, Boltzmann did the same.
According to the main current logical-philosophical accounts of belief change, they
should have given up their theoretical enterprise and change their beliefs about the promise of
the kinetic theory of gases. However, for all we know, they did not change their beliefs and
placed more and more confidence in the theory. Prima facie, Maxwell and Boltzmann have
thus been guilty of a rather severe kind of irrationality, or incoherence.
How are we to described and analyze this case? We cannot just tell the story of
Maxwell and Boltzmann inventing statistical mechanics and explaining more and more
phenomena or the story of statistical mechanics being progressively developed and refined as
if there was no epistemological anomaly. In order to account for the beginnings of statistical
mechanics, our story has to be based on an underlying view of how scientists reason and
conceive of the relationships between the hypotheses they consider and the available data.
Moreover, this underlying view cannot be the usual one coming either from methodology or
from the epistemology of belief change.
My aim in this paper is to contribute to the working-out of such an underlying view.
Given the available theoretical proposals in epistemology and in the formal study of belief
change, which are much too abstract to be directly applicable to such a case, my enterprise is
as much one in the methodology of history of science as one in epistemology and philosophy
of science. In section 2, I present two methodological options as regards Maxwell’s and
Boltzmann’s rationality and argue in favor of the one leaving open the possibility that they
have not been guilty of irrationality. In section 3, I briefly present some theoretical
approaches to belief change in order to indicate which ones could provide the best account of
the historical case if only they were slightly adapted. In sections 4-6, I come back to the
description of the case in order to refine it and point to the aspects of it that according to me
are in need of formalization or theorization. In section 7, I propose some clues to such a
formalization.
2. Methodological setting
Let us first of all try and locate this inquiry within the different available domains.
Two main domains appear as possible loci for such an inquiry: methodology and
epistemology. I could either focus on the internal development of statistical mechanics and
explore how it has been partly confirmed and partly disconfirmed, what have been the
consequences of a contradiction with empirical data, etc., or on Maxwell’s and Boltzmann’s
epistemic attitudes. For sure, methodology and epistemology are close to one another: as V.
Hendricks emphasizes, “methodological recommendations for ‘rational’ scientific inquiry,
truth-conduciveness, reliability, convergence, strategies for winning games, changing beliefs
economically and reliably, and the like, are at the very core of many formal epistemological
approaches” (2006, 24). Rationality is precisely at the meeting point between methodology
and epistemology. As one puzzle in the historical episode I focus on is precisely about
rationality, I claim this episode is best analyzed by taking the actors’ beliefs and other
epistemic attitudes into account, and not just the internal development of the theory. The
specific heats problem is less an abstract problem for the kinetic theory than a problem about
the analysis of Maxwell’s and Boltzmann’s views on the dynamics of scientific theorizing.
The next methodological point is to set up a strategy for handling the rationality
puzzle. Two options are available: (i) assume that Maxwell and Boltzmann have been
irrational; (ii) suspend our judgment and try to build up a sufficiently flexible theoretical
framework allowing us not to decide beforehand that they were irrational. In other words,
such a framework would leave open the possibility that Maxwell and Boltzmann were not
irrational to develop statistical mechanics further in spite of its contradiction with available
data. Option (i) would amount to a paradox: the development of statistical mechanics would
be seen as rational (because of its impressive empirical success) whereas the individual
scientists developing it would be seen as irrational. Such an option would thus create a new
problem instead of clarigying one.
 Accordingly, I think the second option is worth trying out, at least in this case which
seems to be one whose only components are the physicists, the theory and the data. No extra-
scientific factors, like a anti-scientific Zeitgeist, are involved that could result in irrational
decisions. In other cases, as the one analyzed in Cushing (1994), historical contingency seems
to have exerted an important influence on scientists facing a difficult choice between two
theoretical approaches, namely the Bohrian interpretation of quantum mechanics on one hand
and its deterministic counterpart on the other. (Cushing would not admit that his analysis
implies that scientists are irrational in using non evidential criteria for theory choice; however,
following Saunders (2005), I think that Cushing’s book results in claiming that the physicists
who accepted the Bohrian interpretation of quantum mechanics were irrational not to compare
it seriously with its deterministic counterpart).
As far as the specific heats problem in concerned, Maxwell’s and Boltzmann’s can be
idealized as pure scientists, insensitive to extra-scientific influences, and their epistemic
attitudes about statistical mechanics can be idealized as being isolated from other factors. This
seems to be a pure case in epistemology, against which to test various theories.
3. Approaches to belief change
The mother of all theories of belief change, so to speak, is the AGM theory of belief
revision (Alchourrón et al. 1985). Its starting point is the modeling of a belief-state as a set of
propositions (or sentences) closed under logical entailment. This is of course an idealization.
According to Gärdenfors (1988), this idealization “is judged in relation to the rationality
criteria for the epistemological theory” (9). This implies that for a rational agent, it is
required, within the limits of her cognitive abilities, to believe the sentences implied by any
sentence she believes. Of course the precise characterization of human cognitive abilities are
crucial here; another useful complement would be also to specify whether other epistemic
attitudes than belief are concerned by this idealization.
Within this model of belief-state, belief revision is said to be the change in the belief-
state occurring in response to epistemic inputs, namely the encounter of the agent with new
information, be it by experience or by testimony. The AGM theory sets out principles for
belief revision. Let K be a belief set and P a proposition corresponding to an epistemic input.
K*P is the result of revising K by adding P and accordingly (that is, minimally) changing K.
Two cases have to be distinguished, according to whether P is logically consistent with
K or not. When P is logically consistent with K, P is simply added to K as well as the
propositions it logically entails (in symbols: K+P = {Q K ∪{P}→Q}, where “+” is the
expansion operator and “+” denotes logical entailment.)
P can also be withdrawn from K (the result is K– P where “–” is the contraction
operator). However, in general, if P is withdrawn from K, other beliefs also are. AGM theory
includes a principle of informational economy governing which beliefs have to be removed
together with P, according to which the set of removed beliefs must be minimal. However,
this principle is not enough to choose, among all beliefs which are “tied” to P, the ones which
will be removed. Purely logical considerations are insufficient for that matter. Other
principles are required. Gärdenfors has proposed an ordering of the conserved beliefs in terms
of a relation of epistemic entrenchment; whereas Spohn (1987) argues in favor of a relation of
epistemic plausibility. These relations can reflect personal preferences.
The main claim in AGM theory is that expansion and contraction are interdefinable
within the Harper and Levi identities:
Harper identity: K–P = (K *¬P) ∩K
Levi identity: K*P = (K – ¬P)+P
Belief revision is always, according to AGM theory, the composition of a contraction and an
expansion.
The AGM theory has been refined and revised several times. In most of its successors,
however, the principle according to which when P is logically inconsistent with K, several
beliefs in K have to be removed before including P remains a basic condition of rationality. In
order to fulfill our task, namely in order to formalize Maxwell’s and Boltzmann’s epistemic
attitudes without a priori suspecting them of irrationality, the AGM theory thus has to be
amended. I will examine some of the most recent proposals in section 5, after having worked
out a more precise description of Maxwell’s and Boltzmann’s epistemic attitudes.
Belief change can also be modeled within a Bayesian framework. To put it briefly, the
principles of Bayesianism imply a redistribution of the agent’s degrees of belief when she
accepts a new information which is at odds with her prior beliefs. However, neither Maxwell
or Boltzmann seem to have diminished their confidence in the validity of statistical
mechanics, that is, attributed lesser degrees to their belief that it is a satisfactory theory.
Consequently, the Bayesian framework has from the same drawback, relative to our historical
case, as AGM theory: it is difficult within it to account for Maxwell and Boltzmann both
accepting the specific heats data and working out statistical mechanics.
4. A web of beliefs, acceptances and doubts
In this section, I try to give the richest description I can of Maxwell’s and Boltzmann’s
epistemic attitudes about statistical mechanics and the specific heats problem (given that our
only access to these attitudes is through their papers). Elements of different nature are parts of
this description: data, mathematical results, hypotheses of various generality, models,
fundamental theories (e.g. Newtonian mechanics), speculations. The relationships between
these elements and Maxwell’s and Boltzmann’s minds may be equally diverse.
In section 4.1, I present Maxwell’s own reflexive views in 1872, at a time where
statistical mechanics has already taken off. In section 4.2, I propose a tentative classification
of Maxwell’s attitudes vis a vis statistical mechanics in 1860. This is a first step toward the
development of an informal equivalent of Gärfenfors’ relation of epistemic entrenchment or
of Spohn’s relation of epistemic plausibility.  In section 4.3, however, I show that no simple,
unified picture of Maxwell’s epistemic state can be given, since his beliefs make up
disconnected sets and are cannot be classified according to a single axis of entrenchment or
plausibility. I insist that my aim in this section is to present the relevant elements in an
informal way, as a preparation to the more formal proposals of section 5.
4.1 Maxwell about molecules in 1872
A specific features of the historical case I focus on is that its main actors are all but
naïve about their own epistemic states and the hypotheses they are entertaining. Here is a
striking example of Maxwell’s reflexive stance about molecules, whose existence was still
uncertain at the time. In a lecture he gave in 1872 at the British Association for the
Advancement of Science, and published in Nature the year after, Maxwell examines the
following questions: What is known about molecules? What is hypothesized, or speculated?
He proposes the following ranking of the available results concerning molecules:
“We may divide the ultimate results [of molecular science] into three ranks, according
to the completeness of our knowledge of them.
To the first rank belong the relative masses of the molecules of different gases,
and their velocities in meters per second. These data are obtained from experiments on
the pressure and density of gases, and are known to a high degree of precision.
In the second rank we must place the relative size of the molecules of different
gases, the length of their mean paths, and the number of collisions in a second. These
quantities are deduced from experiments on the three kinds of diffusion. Their
received values must be regarded as rough approximations till the methods of
experimenting are greatly improved.
There is another set of quantities which we must place in the third rank,
because our knowledge of them is neither precise, as in the first rank, nor approximate,
as in the second, but is only as yet of the nature of a probable conjecture. These are:
The absolute mass of a molecule, its absolute diameter, and the number of molecules
in a cubic centimeter.”
In this lecture, Maxwell thus carries out a careful and self-conscious evaluation of the
various available results about molecules. However, this evaluation occurs quite late after the
beginning of the whole enterprise of statistical mechanics. What would be mostly relevant is a
similar evaluation of Maxwell's own hypotheses in 1859-1860, when he was working at his
first paper on the kinetic theory of gases.
4.2 Maxwell about the possibility of statistical mechanics in 1860
The only resource we have about Maxwell’s views in 1860 is indirect: it consists in what
we can infer from his paper. Here is a tentative reconstruction:
(1) About the applicability of the principles of mechanics to microscopic objects: Maxwell
evaluates it as highly plausible, even if he regards the analogy from the visible to the invisible
as problematic.
(2) About the atomic hypothesis: The validity of the atomic hypothesis is indirectly at stake in
the paper. Undoubtedly, Maxwell was profoundly convinced of its truth, and this conviction
was the mainspring of his investigations in statistical mechanics. Since only indirect and far
away consequences of it are affected by the specific heats problem, it is not seriously
questioned.
(3) About the “mechanical analogy”, namely the hypothesis that the gaseous molecules are
reasonably similar to their surrogates in the model, i.e., billiard balls. Assessing the
plausibility of the “mechanical analogy”  is one of the aims of Maxwell’s paper. His
conclusion is cautious. For the sake of analysis, the mechanical analogy should be
decomposed into three elements: the ideal gas idealizations, the probabilistic hypotheses
underlying the statistical computation, and the available empirical data. Let us examine
Maxwell’s attitude about these three elements in turn.
(a) Ideal gas idealizations (according to which the volume of the molecules is negligible
compared to the whole volume of the gas; the collision time is negligible; the intermolecular
forces are negligible). Clausius considered that these idealizations were safe, in the sense that
for him, they did not introduce any distortion in the representation of gases. As for Maxwell,
he gave them up in 1866-1867. Here are the reasons why he changed his mind about these
idealizations. Whereas he thought in 1860 that the model based on these idealization is
equivalent to a model where molecules are represented by centers of forces, namely material
points interacting with each other according to repulsive forces at short distances, and
attractive and quickly decreasing forces at larger distances, he demonstrated in 1867 that the
ideal gas model and the centers of forces model are not equivalent. We can thus infer from the
1867 paper, that is, from Maxwell's change of mind, that in 1860, the validity of these
idealizations was uncertain but slightly plausible.
(b) Probabilistic hypotheses used in the statistical computation, namely equiprobability of the
directions of bounce after a collision, and independence of the three directions of a molecule's
velocity. These hypotheses are held as entirely safe by Maxwell; he even gives arguments to
justify them.
(c) Available empirical data: Some were almost fully accepted by Maxwell, as by every
physicist at the time, like the thermodynamic relations and the measures of specific heats;
some were very doubtful, like the dependence of the viscosity coefficient on density.
The main conclusion we can draw from this description is that the meaning of the
expression “acceptance of a hypothesis” is highly ambiguous. Moreover, it crucially depends
on the type of hypothesis considered. For instance, Maxwell only accepts in 1860 the
hypothesis according to which the ideal gas idealizations are safe because he makes a mistake
about the kind of model they allow for and believes this model to be equivalent to a centers of
forces model. This is therefore a default acceptance, which can be attributed to the fact that he
was not logically omniscient: he could not grasp, in 1860, the set of all the logical
implications of the ideal gas idealizations. This default acceptance is different from the
positive, well thought-out acceptance of the probabilistic hypotheses Maxwell uses in his
statistical computation. Consequently, any formal analysis of Maxwell’s, and more generally
of scientists’ epistemic attitudes has to carefully differentiate between either types of
acceptances or degrees of acceptance.
4.3 Disjoined hierarchies of beliefs
In the last section, I have shown that there are several ways in which an item of
science (hypothesis, model, set of data) can be said to be accepted by a scientist. Acceptance
in this context is not a univocal notion. The picture of Maxwell’s epistemic state has still to be
complicated further, since the various items in section 4.2 cannot be ordered along a single
axis of acceptance, or represented by a relation of epistemic entrenchment possessing the
property of being a total pre-order . These items form disjoined groups the relationships
among which are complex. For instance, the evaluation of the “mechanical analogy” depends
on the validity of the atomic hypothesis and on the validity of the hypothesis of the
applicability of Newtonian mechanics to molecules. Whereas the validity of the latter depends
on the validity of the former, the former might be true but the latter false.
A complex picture of chains of dependence relations may be drawn, according to the
following elements:
(i) The three fundamental hypotheses underlying statistical mechanics, namely: applicability
of Newtonian mechanics to the description of molecules, atomism, and applicability of
probabilistic tools, are partly independent. Consequently, they generate three chains of
dependence relations.
(ii) Different types of dependence relations come into play, according to their starting point:
fundamental hypotheses or idealizations involved in models’ tractability.
Point (ii) can be illustrated with Maxwell's 1867 paper, in which he investigates a
model in which molecules are centers of forces. In order to get results from this model and
compare them to empirical data, it is necessary, at some point, to give a specific form to the
intermolecular force law. Absolutely no clues to such a mathematical function were available
at the time, since molecules were highly hypothetical, even speculative entities. In this state of
total uncertainty, any mathematical function for the force law would do (within the domain of
the usual force laws in mechanics). Now, only one function makes the computation possible:
the equations are not solvable unless the intermolecular force is proportional to 1/r5. The
justification for the adoption of the hypothesis that the intermolecular force is proportional to
1/r5  is thus strictly model-dependant.
These examples indicate that a faithful formalization of Maxwell's epistemic state in
1860 should be represented by distinct hierarchies of belief and acceptance sets. This
epistemic structure is probably not exceptional among scientists.
5. The conditional nature of the elements of the Maxwell’s and Boltzmann’s epistemic
states
The next step in my analysis of Maxwell’s and Boltzmann’s epistemic states is to take
into account an important aspect of most propositions which are accepted of fully believed by
scientists, namely their conditional form, for instance: “If such theory or hypothesis or such
empirical data is correct, then …”. The unconnected hierarchies that the propositions accepted
by a scientist build up derive from this conditional nature, as well as from the various degrees
of acceptance which are assigned to the antecedents.
It might seem that in the historical case I focus on some beliefs or accepted
propositions are not conditional, for instance Newton laws. Well, it could be that for Maxwell
and Boltzmann, Newton laws are true without any doubt at the macroscopic level - but this is
not relevant for the specific heats problem. The validity of Newton's laws at the microscopic
level is highly dependent on other hypotheses concerning the behavior of molecules. Maxwell
and Boltzmann are conscious that an analogical transfer from the macroscopic level to the
microscopic one is a risky process in a state of total uncertainty or darkness about the
existence and nature of molecules. However, they also know that applying such an analogy is
a very good way to overcome this “profound darkness” (cf. Boltzmann's quote below).
Maxwell and Boltzmann are also conscious that within these conditionals, the
dependence of the consequent on the antecedent comes with degrees. Boltzmann, in a 1895
paper, discusses the various modes of this conditional dependence, underlining the fact that
even when a proposition is true if another one is, in a case where one does not know whether
the antecedent is true, one should not retain from attempting to develop the consequences of
the consequent. Here are some quotes illustrating Boltzmann’s methodological advice.
Boltzmann, in his paper “On certain questions of the theory of gases”,  first quotes
Lord Salisbury claiming that nature is a “mystery”:
“What the atom of each element is, whether it is a movement or a thing or a vortex, or
a point having inertia, all these questions are surrounded by profound darkness. I dare
not use any less pedantic word than entity to designate the ether, for it would be a
great exaggeration of our knowledge if I were to speak of it as a body, or even as a
substance”.
Boltzmann then comments on Lord Salisbury’s quote:
“It this is so - and hardly any physicist will contradict this - then neither the Theory of
Gases nor any other physical theory can be quite a congruent account of facts …”
“Every hypothesis must derive indubitable results from mechanically well-defined
assumptions by mathematically correct methods. If the results agree with a large series
of facts, we must be content, even if the true nature of facts is not revealed in every
respect. No one hypothesis has hitherto attained the last end, the Theory of Gases not
excepted. But this theory agrees in so many respects with the facts, that we can hardly
doubt that in gases certain entities, the number and size of which can be roughly
determined, fly about pell-mell. Can it be seriously expected that they will behave
exactly as aggregates of Newtonian centers of forces, or as the rigid bodies of our
mechanics? And how awkward is the human mind in diving the nature of things, when
forsaken by the analogy of what we can see and touch?”
Boltzmann’s comment shows that he carefully evaluates the reliability of the various
conditionals involved in statistical mechanics, and does so even though the epistemic status of
one of the most important elements of statistical mechanics, namely, the atomic hypothesis, is
a “mystery”. In the same way as a model of a scientist's epistemic state should account for the
degrees of conditional dependence attributed to hypotheses, it should account for the
scientist’s reflexive evaluation of the hypotheses the consequences of which she explores.
Maxwell, in his review of A treatise on the kinetic theory of gases by Watson (the
book summarizes and synthesizes Maxwell's work), expresses the same kind of self-
consciousness that constitutes an important aspect of a scientist's epistemic attitude toward a
theory whose foundations are uncertain:
“The clear way in which Mr. Watson has demonstrated these propositions leaves us no
escape from the terrible generality of his results. Some of these, no doubt, are very
satisfactory to us in our present state of opinion about the constitution of bodies, but
there are others which are likely to startle us out of our complacency, and perhaps
ultimately to drive us out of all the hypotheses in which we have hitherto found refuge
into the state of thoroughly conscious ignorance which is the prelude to every real
advance in knowledge.”
This quote should engage us in including a special treatment for the category of beliefs
bearing on mathematical methods and conclusions in our representation of epistemic states
and belief change.
6. Belief change and theory change
Given the dynamic nature of our inner life, the study of its static structures can only be
a first stage. In this section, I focus on belief change. Maxwell’s case is again rich enough to
bring out some characteristic features of belief change in a scientific context.
Between 1860 and 1867, Maxwell changed his mind about three topics:
(i) the scientific value of the kinetic theory of gases,
(ii) the comparison of the billiard balls model and the centers of forces model,
(iii) and the independence of viscosity coefficient on the density of the gas.
A comparison between these three cases will show that a rich description of Maxwell's
epistemic state is necessary to account for belief change in his case – a case which is likely to
possess sufficiently generic features.
(i) At the end of the 1860 paper, Maxwell is, to say the least, puzzled about the fate of
statistical mechanics - more precisely, he expresses a balanced perplexity, considering the
genuine successes of his enterprise (e.g., the microscopic explanation of the ideal gas laws, or
the development of a unified analysis of transport phenomena) as well as its failure to account
for the measured values of specific heats. He nevertheless overcomes the epistemic
discomfort caused by the empirical contradiction encountered by his first attempt at giving a
coherent picture of the dynamics of gases, and explores a new “realization” ( that is, a new
model) of the kinetic theory of gases.
Let us analyze Maxwell’s decision further. The empirical contradiction does not lead
him to give up his theoretical endeavor, his theory stricto sensu, but rather to try and build up
another model mediating between theoretical hypotheses and empirical data. This implies that
a crude formalization of Maxwell's epistemic state in which every proposition concerning the
“dynamical theory of gases” would be put on the same level would be utterly unfaithful. It is
at least necessary to distinguish between propositions relative to the general theoretical
framework he is investigating and propositions relative to the various realizations of this
framework in models, which contain other, sometimes more doubtful hypotheses.
(ii) Although Maxwell begins his 1860 paper by asserting that representing molecules
as billiard balls and as centers of forces is equivalent in terms of the results computed from
the two models, he realizes between 1860 and 1867 that it is not the case, and that the centers
of forces model is more satisfactory - except for specific heats, and disregarding the fact that a
central hypothesis remains unjustified in this model (namely, the hypothesis about the precise
form of the intermolecular force law).
Maxwell’s belief change is not the result of “observation”, unless the concept of
observation is so stretched as to include the results of mathematical computations – which
would be paradoxical. This indicates that distinct sources of belief change may be involved
scientific change, namely: empirical data, testimony, the possibility and results of calculation.
Moreover, these distinct sources of belief change may have different effects according to the
element on which they act. For instance, in our case, empirical data contradict the
consequences of a physical model, but not the theoretical principles the model realizes. In that
case, the acceptance of the theoretical principles is not at stake, but rather the acceptance of
the validity of the model.
(iii) In 1860, Maxwell was agnostic about the dependence of the viscosity coefficient
of a gas upon its density. The few available data at the time seemed to point to a dependence,
but they were too inaccurate to be fully relied on. Maxwell's billiard balls model implied that
the viscosity was independent of the density, but many features of this model seemed
doubtful, to him in the first place. In 1866, Maxwell had acquired a full belief about this
point: he was entirely convinced that the viscosity coefficient of a gas does not depend on its
density. In this case, the cause of his belief change was “observation”, or better data
acquisition by careful and repeated experiments, together with model exploration.
From points (i)-(iii), we can conclude that observation, as of course an important cause
of belief change – and consequently of theory change – cannot be considered, nevertheless, as
the sole cause of belief change. Moreover, the effects of the various causes of belief change
vary according to which subset of beliefs is concerned. In Maxwell's case, a distinction among
beliefs concerning the theoretical framework of the kinetic theory of gases and beliefs
concerning the various models which realize it seems necessary - but this distinction is not
clear cut. In order to tell whether a given hypothesis belongs to the theoretical framework or
to a model, the best method is sometimes to investigate how it is affected by a cause of belief
change!
7. Some proposals
The (simplified) case-study presented in sections 4-6 suggests the following proposals,
which aim at giving general answers to two questions:
- How should a scientist’s epistemic state be represented in a formal theory of belief
change?
- What are the possible sources of belief change?
7.1 Representation of a scientist’s epistemic state
The case-study reinforces Friedman and Halpern’s claim that “it is important to
describe the underlying ontology or scenario for the belief change process”, and to ask “what
it means for something to be believed by an agent” (1997) (the two questions above are
inspired by this paper). In order to represent belief change indeed, the first task is to describe
what is affected by change.  Now most available proposals, perhaps excepting Bochman’s
(1999), seem to be too idealized to account for the various aspects described in sections 4-6.
Notice first that in my historical case, the object we wish to represent is not,
Maxwell’s epistemic state proper, but only the part of it concerning statistical mechanics. This
part may be conceived of as equivalent to a theory which is not yet finished, or a theory in
progress, so to speak. The representation of such a theory in progress should take into account
the unconnected character of the various sets of propositions composing it, since it would be
simplistic to suppose that these propositions are organized by a unique ordering representing
their relative strength or the relative confidence the agent has in their truth. One should leave
open the way for including several orderings in the representation, as in (Lindström and
Rabinowicz 1991). Lindström and Rabinowicz suggest to replace the usual functional notion
of belief revision (introduced by AGM) by a relational notion, which results from a
weakening of the original notion of epistemic entrenchment by not assuming it to be
connected. Their motivation is that they want to allow that some propositions may be
incomparable with respect to epistemic entrenchment. As a result, the family of “fallbacks”
(representing the possible products of a revision) around a given theory needs not be nested.
The notion of a family of unnested fallback theories may help represent the variety of
epistemic attitudes the agent entertains vis à vis the different propositions within its epistemic
state (or the theory she is trying to develop). Intuitively, several uncertainty axes are needed to
represent these attitudes, since the plausibility of the relevant propositions are evaluated
according to various scales: for instance, the hypothesis that atoms are rigid bodies seems
plausible when it leads to successful models of statistical mechanics, but not so plausible
when confronted to the spectroscopic data, which suggest a large number of degrees of
freedom. The family of unnested fallbacks can thus represent the dependence of plausibility
assignments on the context and aim of the evaluation.
Here are some other examples of this point. As we have seen, some parts of the
epistemic state (or of the theory in progress) can be described non defeasible, e.g., Newtonian
mechanics or the atomic hypothesis. However, the notion of non defeasibility is context
relative: in other research domains than statistical mechanics or the kinetic theory of gases,
the atomic hypothesis, for example, may be doubtful. It should be emphasized that the
relevant context here is not even statistical mechanics in general, but statistical mechanics as
it is developed when one deliberately neglects everything in it that would call the atomic
hypothesis into question. This narrow context is a post-1860 context, corresponding to a
selection of Maxwell’s whole epistemic states in which he has gone beyond his doubts about
the capacity of statistical mechanics to account for macroscopic matter.
One may object to the “several axes of epistemic entrenchment proposal” that it relies
on a confusion between two distinct project, namely (i) measuring the epistemic preferences
of agent and (ii) investigating into the justification of beliefs or hypotheses. The relation of
epistemic entrenchment is the main tool of (i), which is a formal project. (ii), by contrast, is
more a project in epistemology and it is not clear whether it can be formalized. This objection
implies that whereas (i) is relevant to belief change, (ii) is not. My response to this objection
is that the description I gave in sections 4-6 shows that (ii) is definitely relevant to belief
change and that (i) does not suffice to study it. This is the reason why I believe that the picture
of the epistemic state should be enriched. In the end on this section, I make two proposals
toward such an enrichment.
Apart from the notion of non defeasible proposition, the notion of working hypothesis
can also be used in the description of a scientist’s epistemic state. It is context dependent as
well. Some examples of working hypotheses are models, beliefs about mathematical tools,
and beliefs about mathematical conclusions. The second category of “beliefs about
mathematical tools and conclusions” is important in every case where theoretical physicists
are dealing with not sophisticated enough mathematical tools and have to improve them.
Usually, they are uncertain about the validity of their inventions.
A last feature of a scientist’s epistemic state (or theory in progress) is that it is striving
toward a fully coherent stage. This dynamic component is what differentiates it from the
epistemic state, or a theory, of someone who is not interested in scientific progress. It should
also be included in the representation of a scientist’ epistemic state, perhaps in the guise of
dynamic principles of exploration of the consequences of the non defeasible propositions
(other examples of such principles would be analogies).
7.2 Sources of belief  and theory change
As emphasized above, new empirical data (namely, controlled results of observation
and experimentation) are obviously good candidates as sources of belief or theory change.
The notion of empirical data is much more constrained than the notion of “observation”
referred to in the current theories of belief revision. For instance, an isolated measurement
result would count as a reliable motor of belief change only in very special cases. One should
restrain from considering that new reliable, empirical data automatically force belief revision
whenever they contradict what is previously known, believed or worked on as hypotheses.
The above presented case shows that one should leave open the possibility that empirical data
are included in the epistemic state even if they contradict other elements in it, with no charge
of irrationality. We shall see how this can be (tentatively) done in the next section.
One should also take seriously the fact that the agents under consideration, even if
they are scientists, are not logically omniscient. Logical operations on the elements of the
epistemic state itself (deductions) should be allowed as providers of occasions of belief
change. As Harman (2004) claims, theoretical reasoning is actually a way of changing one’s
epistemic state.
7.3. About Maxwell’s and Boltzmann’s rationality
According to AGM postulates, Maxwell and Boltzmann are irrational, because they
do not give up statistical mechanics even though it is refuted by empirical data. Worse, they
go on elaborating it. As AGM postulates are taken to be “general rationality postulates”,
Maxwell’s and Boltzmann’s persistency suggests that other rationality postulates should be
considered instead.
I suggest that what I called the “dynamic component” of the epistemic state (or theory
in progress) is responsible for Maxwell’s and Boltzmann’s rationality in spite of all
appearances. This dynamic component is indeed governed by a rationality principle which is
generally neglected, namely the principle of positive coherence (cf. Pollock 1979 and Harman
2004), according to which you not only have to avoid inconsistencies (this is the principle of
negative coherence), but also to “find explanations of things in which you are interested”.
Maxwell’s and Boltzmann’s theoretical efforts are best viewed as guided by this principle,
since their global scientific view of matter is more coherent (in the sense of “explanatory”)
when they put statistical mechanics into it than otherwise. The principle of positive coherence
is thus stronger, in the case of scientific investigation, than the principle of negative
coherence, which says that one should avoid inconsistencies. This is at least a tentative
explanation of why Maxwell and Boltzmann were not irrational in developing an empirically
refuted theory.
8. Conclusion
My starting point in this paper has been the apparent paradox of two physicists,
Maxwell and Boltzmann, further investigating an already refuted theory, namely statistical
mechanics. In order to leave open the possibility that they are not guilty of irrationality, in
spite of the current theories in formal epistemology, I first described Maxwell’s and
Boltzmann’s epistemic attitudes toward statistical mechanics at the time they both were
working it out. In section 7, I presented some proposals, inspired by recent papers about belief
change, accounting for the richness and complexity of scientists’ epistemic states.
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